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Abstract
Leach and Wilson (2002) identified four key tasks of  local government 
leaders. Building on their initiative, this paper examines the task of  developing 
strategic and policy direction at the Icelandic local level from the viewpoint 
of  the Icelandic mayor. In addition, it explores the administrative capacity of  
Icelandic local governance. Individuals occupying mayoral positions in Iceland 
always serve as heads of  administration. At times, mayors are council members 
(political mayors), while other times they are hired based on their professional 
skills (manager-mayors). The findings suggest that mayors of  both types play 
crucial roles in long-term policy making. However, the study shows that the 
daily work of  manager-mayors is often hindered by fragmentation and lack 
of  specialisation within the administration as well as by the laymen rule upon 
which the council-committee system is based. 
Keywords: local government; administrative capacity; long-term policy 
making.
Introduction
The institutional structure of  local government decision making varies considerably be-
tween countries. Nevertheless, local governance is normally a combination of  political 
leadership, administrative leadership and the laymen rule (Mouritzen & Svara 2002). 
Leach & Wilson (2000, 14-16) formulated a model of  key tasks of  local leaders based 
mainly on the work of  Kotter and Lawrence (1974) and Selznick (1957). These key 
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functions involved maintaining cohesiveness, developing strategic and policy direction, 
representing the local authority in the external world and ensuring task accomplishment. 
Concepts such as strategic thinking, agenda setting, policy making and budgeting are 
used to describe various types of  decision making within public organisations. Thus, all 
local government makes strategy. However, there is a fundamental difference between 
long-term and short-term decision making. The former involves thinking ahead and 
making decisions for the future in a proactive way, while the latter entails reactive deci-
sion making (as in a crisis) (Getimis & Hlepas 2006; Leach & Wilson 2000). Overall, 
research on Icelandic public administration indicates that there is a lack of  long-term 
strategic thinking and that policy making and agenda setting are often more coincidental 
than deliberate (Árnason, Nordal, & Ástgeirsdóttir 2010; Sigurgeirsdóttir 2006; Sigur-
geirsdóttir 2005). Research findings also suggest that the decision-making process is 
even less structured at the Icelandic local level than it is at the central level (Kristinsson 
2014; Kristinsson 2001). 
Furthermore, there is a lively theoretical debate on who should be responsible for 
strategic thinking and policy making. Some view the political-administrative relationship 
as a dichotomy in which there should be a clear task division between politicians and 
the administration, with politicians responsible for decision making and administrators 
responsible for implementation and daily management of  the organisation (Demir 2009; 
Jacobsen 2009; Mouritzen & Svara 2002). Others contend that the political-administra-
tive relationship is interactive and overlapping, with unclear boundaries between the 
roles of  politicians and administrators (Stocker Thompson-Fawcett 2014; Zhang & Fei-
ock 2009; Bergström, Magnusson, & Ramberg 2008). According to the first viewpoint, 
politicians should lead the decision-making process, while adherents to the second view-
point accept administrative leadership within the policy-making process. However, it is 
also possible to argue that both viewpoints assume that both politicians and administra-
tors have the capacity to fulfil their roles in the policy process.
This paper explores the task of  developing strategic and policy direction at the Ice-
landic local level in relation to the overall administrative capacity of  Icelandic local gov-
ernance. Furthermore, it aims to answer the following questions:
Who is leading the task of  developing strategic and policy direction at the Icelandic 
local level? Based on these findings, what conclusions may be drawn about the adminis-
trative capacity of  Icelandic local governance?
To deal with these questions the Icelandic mayors role perception in relation to the 
policy making process is discussed. These findings are then discussed in relation to the 
overall number of  specialised staff  within the town halls. In general, the council, the 
local leaders and the administration are highly interlinked thus when one division is 
lacking in capacity other divisions of  local government is affected. Therefore, lack of  
leadership capacity within the council is expected to put pressure on the mayors and/or 
the administration. In a similar manner lack of  professional capacity in the administra-
tion is expected to affect the council and the mayors negatively. This study is based on 
the viewpoint of  the mayors and therefore it is not possible to draw any conclusions on 
239Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
what effects lack of  leadership on behalf  of  the manager-mayor and the political mayor 
would have on council and the local administration. 
The paper is divided into eight sections of  which the first concentrates on the theo-
retical background of  the discussion. It then goes on to introducing the data collection in 
the second section and introducing the Icelandic local government structure in the third 
section. The fourth section is the first to deal with empirical data as it introduces findings 
on the number of  staff  in the town halls. In section five to seven findings on the task of  
developing strategic and policy direction are introduced with each section dealing with 
one of  the three strands of  the task. The eighth and final section discusses the findings. 
2. Strategic decision making and administrative capacity
Lately leadership has become an extremely desirable quality, something to be cultivated 
and strived for. There is, however, no general agreement on how to become a leader or 
how to demonstrate leadership ability (Bergström, Gianoli, & Rao 2012). Northouse 
(2013) defines leadership as ‘a process whereby an individual influences a group of  indi-
viduals to achieve a common goal’ (p.5). In essence, this definition states that leadership 
entails a two-dimensional process of  control involving leaders as well as followers. The 
group context is important as leadership must include more than one individual; it is 
not possible to express leadership in solitude (Northouse 2013; Parry & Bryman 2006). 
In the context of  Icelandic local government, local leaders may be either administrative 
leaders, political leaders or both, and they may exercise leadership in a variety of  ways. 
Local leaders who use their influence to set visions and shape the culture or structure 
of  the local authority as well as hiring and firing are all exercising power invested in 
their role as a leader of  that unit (Collinson 2011). It is important to try to balance the 
discussion on leadership between a contextual or structural approach and a more indi-
vidual and behavioural approach. Too much emphasis on behaviour may undermine 
the importance of  context and too much emphasis on context makes individuals seem 
helpless in having any influence over their leadership behaviour (Peele 2005, 192). To 
distinguish between these different types or variations of  leadership Mouritzen & Svara 
(2002) argue that governmental systems usually represent some compromise between 
the three principles or elements of  the ‘laymen rule’, ‘political leadership’ and ‘profes-
sionalism’. How each of  these elements is represented within the governmental system 
varies across countries. Mourtizen and Svara also point out that an amateur politician 
frequently brings enthusiasm and passion while the administration with the manager at 
the front brings expertise and rationality into local government. Thus, the main argu-
ment is that ‘to be focused and efficient, governments need professionals who bring 
distinct perspective and background to government’ (Mouritzen and Svara 2002, 53). 
Previous studies have shown that although there are clear differences between the Ice-
landic political mayors and manager-mayors both types play a major role as community 
leaders (Hlynsdóttir 2016a). Thus, this study draws on the example of  Leach and Wilson 
(2002) by viewing leadership behaviour as something exercised by both local politicians 
as well as local administrators.
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In their seminal work Local Political Leadership, Leach and Wilson (2000) name three 
components of  the task of  developing strategic and policy direction: ‘core values’, ‘stra-
tegic vision’ and ‘strategic response’. In their work they pointed out that this task has 
been growing in importance. As an example Demir and Reddick (2012) point out that 
local government politicians could use more skills to think strategically and on long-
term basis as well as approach policy problems from a broader point of  view. Leach 
and Wilson (2000) used the processes of  ‘core values’, ‘strategic vision’ and ‘strategic 
response’ to identify how involved local leaders were in the task of  developing strate-
gic and policy direction. To begin with they point out that ‘core values’ are most often 
expressed in documents such as mission statements. Furthermore, they argue that the 
relevance and usefulness of  such documents vary, and they are often ignored after com-
pletion. Leach and Wilson pointed out that the scope for leadership is greatest with the 
second element, ‘strategic vision’. Here, the agendas are set, and problems are identified 
(or ignored). Furthermore, as pointed out by Leach and Wilson, the private interests 
of  politicians or even administrative leaders may influence which issues are addressed 
and which are not. The third and final element, ‘strategic response’, relates to how to 
respond to anticipated or (perhaps more frequently) unanticipated issues. Leach and 
Wilson described significant variation in how such issues are addressed: ‘…[T]here is 
a major difference between authorities that react to the need to make such choices in 
a short-term incremental fashion, and those that do so within the framework of  an 
explicit longer-term corporate strategy, which explores the links between such choices’ 
(Leach & Wilson 2000, 74). 
A public organisation may be structured in various ways. As an example, Mintzberg 
(1983) differentiated between complex and simple structures, suggesting that structures 
of  small organisations tend to be simple. Others take this argument one step further. For 
example, Randma-Liiv (2002) stated that public organisations in small states face differ-
ent problems and challenges than do bureaucracies in larger states. She pointed out, in 
particular, some problematic issues concerning the ‘ideal type of  bureaucracy’: 
[It] is above all a form of  organisation dedicated to the concept of  
rationality, including accountability to political leadership, recruitment 
based on formal qualifications, career orientation for professionals, 
specialised and differentiated roles, a well understood and stable hi-
erarchy, well-defined spheres of  competence, job security and other 
appropriate incentives (Randma-Liiv 2002, 386).
Ever since Dahl and Tufte published Size and Democracy (1973), there has been an abun-
dance of  literature written about local government size, but social scientists have yet 
to reach any final verdict on the ideal size for a local authority (Denters et al. 2014; 
Baldersheim & Rose 2010; Kjær & Mouritzen 2003; Newton 1982; Dahl & Tufte 1973). 
Dahl and Tufte (1973) argued that size should be measured on two dimensions: citizen 
effectiveness and system capacity. Citizen effectiveness refers to the extent that citizens 
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can control decisions of  the polity, while system capacity refers to the capacity of  the 
polity to respond adequately to its citizens. The debate on democracy and efficiency at 
the local level remains as lively (Denters et al. 2014; Vetter & Kersting 2003) as it was 
when Dahl and Tufte introduced their findings. This debate is particularly relevant to 
research on the Icelandic local government level.
Arguments made on behalf  of  the Icelandic central government and the Local 
Government Associations have long been in favour of  the ‘big is beautiful’ argument 
(Eythórsson 2014). Icelandic researchers have pointed out the problems of  having many 
small municipalities (Kristinsson 2014), highlighting mainly a lack of  capacity for service 
provision and finances as well as possible democratic deficits. Others have emphasised 
the problems that may follow in the aftermath of  an amalgamation of  municipalities 
(Eythórsson 2003). As of  yet, there has been only one major study (Ragnarsson 2003) 
on cooperation projects at the local level in Iceland1. In his study Ragnarsson defined 
the concept of  capacity as the number of  citizens and the amount of  income that a 
municipality needs to be able to provide its residents with the services they need and 
want (p. 14). Another approach to the concept of  capacity may be found in Stone (1993, 
17)nongovernmental as well as governmental. I f  a governing coalition is to be viable, 
it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with its main policy agenda. The 
author uses this reasoning as the foundation for comparing regimes by the nature and 
difficulty of  the government tasks they undertake and the level and kind of  resources 
required for these tasks. Political leadership, he argues, is a creative exercise of  politi-
cal choice. involving the ability to craft arrangements through which resources can be 
mobilized, thus enabling a community to accomplish difficult and nonroutine goals. T o 
a casual observer, regime analysis might appear to be a return to classical urban plural-
ism, the reigning wisdom of  30 years ago and earlier. After all, the executive-centered 
coalition described in Who Governs? (Dahl, 1961 as he suggests that ‘technical capac-
ity’ may be enhanced through technical competence and the training and expertise of  
administrative staff. Similar emphasis on human resource management is at the heart of  
Farazmand (2004, 6) discussion on administrative capacity as he points out the necessity 
of  administrative staff  to be highly qualified, able and motivated in order to tackle daily 
management problems as well as the strategic choices of  tomorrow. In a similar man-
ner Lundtorp (2000, 25) suggests that the administration must be able to demonstrate 
leadership and handle specialised tasks in a professional way. Thus, using a definition by 
Polidano (2000, 805) administrative capacity is ‘the ability of  the permanent machinery 
of  government to implement policies, deliver services and provide policy advice to de-
cision-makers.’ In the Icelandic context issues related to the capacity of  local authorities 
to provide services effectively and efficiently have been among the main arguments for 
amalgamation in Iceland in the past few decades(Eythórsson 2014). 
Grounded in the above discussion this study views the professional ability of  local 
administration as an important part of  administrative capacity. Thus, the number of  
specialised staff  within the town hall may serve as a good indicator of  the administra-
tive capacity at the Icelandic local level. This leads to the next section on data collection. 
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3. Data collection
The data used in this paper was collected for a larger project on leadership at the Ice-
landic local level2. The study relied mainly on two sources of  data. Firstly, a telephone 
survey was conducted in December 2011. At that time, there were 76 municipalities 
in Iceland. One municipality was in the process of  being merged into a neighbouring 
municipality, and another was in the process of  hiring a new manager-mayor. These 
two municipalities were therefore excluded from the survey. The survey questions were 
based on the questionnaires used in a study on European mayors (Bäck, Heinelt, & Mag-
nier 2006, 379) and in the U.Di.T.E study3 (Andersson & Mouritzen 1998, 292). Thus, by 
basing the questionnaire and interview questions on these previous studies the research 
design covered both the political aspect of  the Icelandic mayors’ position as well as the 
executive role. The second source of  data was semi-structured interviews. The lower 
limit for populations of  the targeted municipalities was set at 500 inhabitants. One of  
the main issues of  the study was the interaction between different types of  mayors and 
local administrations. As very small municipalities have a limited administrative capacity, 
a cap at 500 inhabitants was deemed justifiable. In 2012, there were 50 municipalities 
with more than 500 inhabitants. For the quantitative and qualitative data to be coherent, 
only manager-mayors and political mayors who had participated in the first round of  
data collection were interviewed. The interview session started in April 2012 and lasted 
until October 2012, by that time six mayors had left office without being interviewed. 
The final number of  participants was 12 political mayors and 32 manager-mayors. The 
sample covered 88 per cent of  the population with a response rate of  100 per cent.  
As both types of  mayors hold a distinctive and public position of  considerable au-
thority, they fall under Odendahl & Shaw (2002) definition of  elites. Moreover, Littig 
(2009) states that the interviewer is not a neutral participant as the interview represents a 
special form of  a social relationship. More importantly the individual being interviewed 
is also not a neutral participant as elite interviews ‘provide a subjective account of  an 
event or issue’ (Richards 1996, 200). Thus, responses in an elite interview are a reflec-
tion of  the values and thoughts of  the interviewee and as such a subjective account of  
the interviewee’s world. Berry (2002) has pointed out some methodological issues to be 
aware of  when interviewing elites. He points out that elites may be prone to exaggera-
tion, which would lead us to ask what they have left out as exaggeration increases the 
amount of  information omitted. Moreover, if  they exaggerate what does that mean for 
their credibility? However, there are ways of  addressing these problems. It is import to 
be prepared and to ask questions about other individuals in the organisation as they may 
not lessen the role of  others by exaggerating their own. It is also helpful to move away 
from questions as in a conversational type of  interview - there is no need for them to be 
linear (p. 681). Another possible solution is to increase the number of  cases or observa-
tions (King, Keohane, & Verba 1994). Thus, by maximising the number of  observations 
or in this case the number of  mayors interviewed the more robust the findings become. 
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4. The context of Icelandic local governance
This section discusses the structure of  local government in Iceland in order to provide 
background information on the context of  Icelandic local governance.4 The Icelandic 
local government system is a council-committee system in which the highest authority 
lies with the council. Icelandic council members are in general amateurs with the excep-
tion of  Reykjavík’s city council; it has 15 members who are all professional politicians. 
The councils of  Iceland’s other municipalities are populated with between 5–11 politi-
cians depending on population size5. Out of  the 75 municipalities in existence in 2012, 
30 had five council members and 30 had seven council members. Kristinsson (2014) has 
shown that councils in larger municipalities more often use the lower limit on council 
membership size. As an example, there are six municipalities with more than 10,000 
inhabitants, but only Reykjavík has a 15-member council. It may be added that while 
Reykjavík has had a 15-member council for the past hundred years6, its population has 
multiplied during that period. According to Kristinsson, this tendency to choose a lower 
limit makes it easier for established parties to gain a majority in the council and makes 
it more difficult for new parties to enter the council. Kristinsson also pointed out that 
where the councils have opted for seven members, the majority has effectively devised 
a method to prevent new parties from entering the council. Nevertheless, an analysis of  
municipalities created through amalgamation shows that the councils in these munici-
palities often use the higher limit. Previous research has shown that this is done mainly 
to make it easier for citizens of  the previously separate municipalities to be represented 
in the council (Eythórsson, Jóhannesson, & Hlynsdóttir 2002). In the past few years, 
there has been a growing concern of  increase in turnover within the councils. As an 
example, 65 per cent of  local councilwomen and 52 per cent of  councilmen in 2010 had 
never sat on the council before (Hagstofa Íslands 2010) an overview of  the 2014 local 
election results revealed similar findings (Hagstofa Íslands 2015). International research 
findings have shown that professional politicians have lower turnover than amateur 
politicians (Verhelst, Reynaert, & Steyvers 2013). A large majority of  Icelandic council 
members are political amateurs in the sense that council membership is not their main 
occupation or source of  income.
The second most important committee after the council itself  is the executive com-
mittee or executive board, which exists only in municipalities with seven or more council 
members. The executive board handles the daily operation of  the municipality alongside 
the head of  administration. Members of  the executive board are appointed from within 
the council and represent proportionally the council minority and majority. As an exam-
ple, when the board consists of  three individuals, two represent the council majority and 
one the minority. This situation is irrespective of  how many parties are represented in 
the council. Thus, not all the parties have a representative on the executive board. 
Other committees tend to be responsible for their functionally defined areas, but 
the Local Government Act (no.138/2011) does not provide these committees with any 
executive powers in their own right. However, this does not prevent other acts from 
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providing these committees with independent functions, such as in child protection ser-
vices. The members of  the committees are often appointed from outside the council on 
a minority and majority basis. These committee members are not necessarily politically 
linked with the political majority or minority in the council, and they are often chosen 
because of  alleged expertise. In the past decade, there has been a growing tendency to 
cut the number of  these committees either by merging them or by having the council or 
the executive board take over their responsibilities.
Similar to the other Nordic countries, the Icelandic system is monistic since the 
power of  local government is concentrated within the elected council (and its commit-
tees). The council and its committees are thus decision makers who exert direct control 
over the local administration. This stands in direct contrast to a dualistic system in which 
the head or chief  executive of  the local administration has executive powers in his/her 
own right even though the council is seen as the main decision-making body (Wollmann 
2004). 
There are two main types of  local government chief  executives. The first type is an 
individual who is also a member of  the council (political mayor) and the second type is 
an individual who is not a member of  the council (manager-mayor). Both types of  chief  
executive play central roles and often possess considerable political and professional 
capacity (Hlynsdóttir 2016b). 
Although the structure of  local government has more or less remained the same 
since 1986, the tasks of  Icelandic local government have changed a great deal (Hlyns-
dóttir 2015). In the early 1990s, Icelandic municipalities were still mainly divided into 
two categories: rural municipalities with little to no urbanisation on the one hand and 
villages or towns on the other. The towns and villages had municipal offices consisting 
of  experts and technical staff  and had at least to some extent developed hierarchical 
administrations. Furthermore, the towns were responsible (or voluntarily took responsi-
bility) for tasks such as planning, sewage, waste management, hot and cold water supply 
and the infrastructure of  urban settlement. In addition, they were also responsible for 
tasks such as the development of  day care services in the 1980s. Many of  these urban 
authorities invested heavily in local businesses. 
In theory, the agricultural authorities had the same responsibilities as their urban 
counterparts. Nevertheless, there was almost no planning in these areas as farmland was 
at the time exempted from planning obligations. There was no sewage or waste manage-
ment, very little water management and no day care services. Other than farms, local 
businesses were scarce, and it was rare for rural municipalities to invest in other local 
businesses, even when they already existed. The local administration found in rural areas 
consisted typically of  a council leader using his home as an office. Thus, at the beginning 
of  the 1990s the share of  Icelandic municipalities in the provision of  welfare services 
was much lower than that found in other Nordic countries (Eythórsson 1999, 64). 
Since then, Icelandic authorities have more or less followed the international trend 
of  increasing the responsibilities and scope of  local government functions (Kuhl-
mann & Wollmann 2014). Icelandic municipalities are now responsible for an extensive 
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amount of  welfare services, such as social services, primary education, and planning and 
disability services. Furthermore, all municipalities have by law (LGA no 138/2011) the 
same responsibilities towards their citizens. As the populations of  a large majority of  
Icelandic municipalities are still relatively small, these reforms have resulted in an exten-
sive network of  local authorities working in cooperation in order to provide services to 
citizens. This leads us to the next section on the number and type of  staff  employed in 
the town halls. 
5. The number of staff in town halls
One of  the main measurements on administrative capacity is the local governments 
capacity to hire professional and specialised staff  into the town hall (Kjær and Mour-
itzen 2003; Lundtorp 2000). Previous studies have shown that Icelandic local authorities 
stress professional capacity and skills when hiring manager-mayors (Hlynsdóttir 2016b), 
less is known about the overall capacity of  the local administrative level. In his 2001 
study on Icelandic local government, Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson pointed out that size 
was a crucial factor in defining the structure of  local administration. At that time, 74 
per cent of  all municipalities had no more than 1–3 staff  members (including the po-
litical or manager-mayor) within the administrative office. It goes without saying that 
such a small administration has very little capacity to employ support staff  or create 
a formal and structured division of  labour. Furthermore, Icelandic councils are very 
small in comparison to their Nordic counterparts. Thus, while councils in other Nordic 
countries often function more as local assemblies (Kristinsson 2014), Icelandic councils 
are usually highly involved in the implementation process, and council members often 
become involved with detailed administrative work. 
During the interviews the mayors were asked to estimate the number of  staff  in their 
respective town halls. They were also asked to indicate the job titles of  their staff  mem-
bers and whether more than one individual held the same job title. Furthermore, the 
mayors were asked to limit their response to their immediate staff, thus only employees 
with offices within the town hall were included. This excludes public employees such as 
teachers or staff  with offices situated outside the town hall itself.  
The number of  staff  working within a given town hall is a good indicator of  the ad-
ministration’s professional capacity. Furthermore, investigating the number of  staff  em-
ployed by a town hall also shows the number of  personnel under the daily supervision 
of  the mayor. Before discussing the average number of  staff  in a town hall, it should be 
pointed out that the standard deviation (SD) is relatively high, which indicates that there 
are substantial differences in the number of  staff  members within each group. The rea-
son for this is mainly the extensiveness of  inter-municipal cooperation. Within each size 
group, there are municipalities that have a disproportionally large number of  personnel 
because of  the breadth of  the services they provide to other municipalities. Similarly, 
there are municipalities with a disproportionally small administration because they re-
ceive services from outside the municipality. Despite their shortcomings, these results 
give an important indicator of  the number as well as the type of  staff  that municipalities 
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are employing into their immediate surroundings. Table 1 displays the average number 
of  municipal personnel divided into four groups according to population size. 
Table 1. Icelandic mayors’ estimation of average number of local government 
administrative staff7
Population Average number of staff SD N
500–999 5 1.5 14
1,000–2,499 10 3.4 13
2,500–4,999 24 7.5 9
5,000–9,999 34 7 3
Total 13 39 39
In the smallest size category (500–999 residents), the average number of  staff  in 
town hall was five. It is rare for municipalities in this size category to hire experts to 
work in the town hall. The staff  typically consisted of  an office manager, bookkeeper, 
payroll clerk and property supervisor. Legal, technical or other kinds of  administrative 
support were received through other channels. There were three main types of  support-
ing channels. The first possibility was to receive the service from an institution built on 
a cooperation scheme (quangos). In such cases, the institution was built on cooperation 
among several municipalities, but the office was semi-independent (i.e., not in-house). 
The second type was when municipalities purchased a service from another municipality 
or a private firm, such as legal assistance. The third possibility was if  the Local Govern-
ment Association provided the services. 
The second population size category was 1,000–2,499 residents. Here, the average 
number of  personnel reached 10 individuals. There was a considerable variation within 
this category, as some of  the municipalities had a disproportionally large administration 
due to having taken over service responsibilities through local government coopera-
tion schemes. In this category, the number of  core staff  (e.g., bookkeepers and clerks) 
increased, and experts such as engineers, planners or social workers began to appear. In 
this size category, it was also common to have divisions within the administration, even 
though in some cases the units only consisted of  one or two employees. Supporting 
staff  such as legal advisers were still non-existent in this category. 
The third category consisted of  municipalities in the size group of  2,500–4,999. On 
average, the municipalities in this group had 24 staff  members in the town hall. These 
municipalities were more likely to be the service providers in cooperation schemes and 
thus had all or many of  the experts in-house. They relied on different divisions in their 
organisation and often had numerous staff  members in each. Moreover, support staffs 
such as lawyers and supporting experts were rarely found in this category. 
The fourth category included municipalities with 5,000–9,999 inhabitants. Munici-
palities in this category had, on average, 34 employees in the town hall. These munici-
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palities were similar in many ways to those in the third category, except in the number of  
personnel. These municipalities usually had more than one person with similar knowl-
edge or expertise and were thus not as reliant on individuals. 
Municipalities with over 10,000 inhabitants were not included in the table. Overall, 
the structure of  the administration was much more complicated and larger than in the 
smaller municipalities. The most significant differences were in the presence of  support 
staff, as these municipalities had numerous lawyers and technical experts in addition to 
various experts and support staff. 
In addition, the Local Government Association runs wide-ranging services for the 
municipalities. Up to 76 per cent of  the respondents in the 2011 mayor survey commu-
nicated with the Association 1–3 times a month and 15 per cent were in weekly contact. 
The Local Government Association is thus an essential provider of  information and 
administrative support for both types of  local leaders. 
The number of  specialised staff  within the town hall has grown within all size cat-
egories since Kristinsson conducted his study in 2001. Although the analysis shows a 
clear connection between population size and number of  specialised staff  the correla-
tion is not as clear cut as one would expect. The extensiveness of  inter-municipal coop-
eration schemes is complicating the matter as it disproportionally boosts the capacity of  
one local authority while shrinking it in another. Nevertheless, the number of  and type 
of  supporting staff  within the town hall indicates that the local administration may not 
always be equipped to provide the council and the local leaders with the support they 
need in their policy-making roles.
6. Policy making at the local level: core values
Theories on the political-administrative relationship suggest that the prerequisite for 
administrative staff  to be able to do their job efficiently, politicians need to set a clear 
course (Frederickson & Smith 2003; Leach & Wilson 2000; Svara 1990). Thus, the may-
ors were asked to estimate to what extent unclear goals in policy making had had a nega-
tive effect on their daily work. 
Table 2.  Unclear goals in local policy making and negative effect on daily work
To a very
great extent
To a
great extent
To
some extent
To a
little extent Not at all N
4 (5%) 7 (9%) 17 (23%) 36 (49%) 10 (14%) 74 (100%)
As shown in Table 2 around 23 per cent had experienced some negative impact, 
while 15 per cent had felt a great or very great negative influence due to a lack of  goals 
in their day-to-day work. When position is added to the analysis, a clear trend emerges, 
as 82 per cent of  political mayors had not experienced any negative effects because of  
unclear goals. In contrast, only half  of  the manager-mayors had experienced little to no 
adverse effects. This suggests that the political mayors are in a much stronger position in 
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their chief  executive role than the manager-mayors. Similar results have also been dem-
onstrated in other studies, such as in the 2006 study of  European mayors, which showed 
that strong mayors (executive or directly elected) rated their personal influence higher 
than did other types of  mayors (Magnier 2006). There are three possible explanations 
for this difference. The first explanation, following the example of  the 2006 European 
mayor study, is that Icelandic political mayors have more discrete power and thus do not 
experience the lack of  goal setting in the same way as the manager-mayors. The second 
explanation suggests that size is an important factor, as political mayors are more often 
found in larger municipalities that are able to provide more professional support to the 
political mayor, while the manager-mayor is more often hired by smaller municipalities 
in order to provide the experience or skills that cannot be provided by other staff  in 
the town hall (Hlynsdóttir 2016b). The third and final explanation is that the political 
mayors may be more reluctant to admit to vague goal setting as they are at the very heart 
of  the goal-setting process.
Budgeting is the most common policy-making process at the Icelandic local level, 
and most other decision making is based on budgeting. The work on the budget plan 
usually takes place in the autumn in Iceland. In general, mayors are deeply involved in 
the budgeting process, but there is a qualitative difference in their involvement. The dif-
ference is both related to the size of  the municipalities and the type of  mayoral position. 
Manager-mayors who had been employed by smaller municipalities of  fewer than 2,500 
residents as well as by larger municipalities pointed out that there were considerable 
differences in the workload and responsibilities between the smaller and larger types of  
municipality. The main issue cited was the number of  staff  members: ‘Here I have more 
staff, I am more involved in developing the ideas, but not calculating everything myself ’. 
(Manager-mayor) 
The most common procedures for councils to set the course in the budgeting pro-
cess are either through manifestos or the coalition agreement of  the majority parties in 
the council. There is considerable variation in how easy it is to integrate ideas and issues 
from these documents into the policy process. Based on an analysis of  online manifes-
tos issued by the Independence Party (the party that runs most often for council at the 
local level) for the 2014 local elections, several conclusions were made. Firstly, manifes-
tos tend to be a mixture of  vague platforms such as ‘all children should have the best 
conditions possible for their education’ and concrete issues such as ‘free oatmeal por-
ridge for all school children’. Secondly, the situation is further complicated by the mixing 
of  issues that the party in question would like to do and those they are definitely going 
to do. A third complicating factor is that the manifestos often address issues that are of  
importance to the local community but are not the responsibility of  local governance, 
such as rural road infrastructure or health care. 
It is therefore not surprising that the importance of  manifestos varies from one 
community to another. Overall, the manager-mayors in the larger municipalities report-
ed having considered the manifesto more often or having integrated it into planning. 
249Eva Marín Hlynsdóttir STJÓRNMÁL
&
STJÓRNSÝSLA
One manager-mayor described a very detailed integration of  the manifesto, the coalition 
agreement and majority decision making.
I made a plan for the election term (four years) based on the manifes-
to, decision making of  the majority and committee discussions. Then 
the staff  and I prioritise and make a project list for each winter. Then 
it is my job to implement these issues. (Manager-mayor) 
There were several such detailed accounts of  how problems and ideas of  the council 
majority are integrated and applied. These cases were, however, a significant minority, 
and most mayors did not report such a structured approach to policy making. Although 
mayors of  both types had experienced negative effects because of  the lack of  goal set-
ting on the behalf  of  the council, the manager-mayors were more direct and sometimes 
even critical of  council members. The core of  this criticism is demonstrated nicely in the 
words of  a manager-mayor who stated that ‘The largest flaw of  local authorities is that 
council members are always doing things; they never have any plans’ (manager-mayor). 
This suggests a culture of  short-term decision-making within Icelandic local councils 
similar to that identified by Leach and Wilson (2002) in their study. This leads us to the 
issue of  strategic vision and who is influencing the process of  agenda setting at the 
Icelandic local level. 
7. Policy making at the local level: a strategic vision
There are various actors within the local government system that participate in decision 
making at the local level. Members of  the council, department heads and committee 
leaders are all in positions that hold some formal power. There may, however, never be 
an actualisation of  that power. Therefore, it has in many ways become common to see 
success in decision making being equated to power (Lukes 2005). Consequently, when 
analysing decision-making at the local level, the perceived influence of  various actors is 
an important indicator of  actual influence patterns (Denters 2006). Respondents were 
asked to estimate the influence of  different actors over local decision making where one 
was low influence and five was high influence.
Table 3. How influential are political and administrative leaders?
 1 2 3 4 5 N Average (1–5)
Political Mayor 0 0 2 (4%) 17 (32%) 35 (65%) 54 (100%) 4.65
Manager-mayor 1 (2%) 0 15 (26%) 29 (51%) 12 (21%) 57 (100%) 3.89
Council leader 0 2 (3%) 6 (10%) 23 (37%) 31 (50%) 62 (100%) 4.34
Leader of executive board 0 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 16 (38 %) 24 (57%) 42 (100%) 4.47
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The findings in Table 3 reveal the importance of  political leadership or, more pre-
cisely, executive political leadership that is in line with the findings of  the 2006 study of  
European mayors (Denters 2006). The Icelandic political mayor was perceived as by far 
the most influential leader, with 97 per cent ranking him/her as high or very high, fol-
lowed by the leader of  the executive board with 95 per cent and the council leader with 
87 per cent. What is interesting in this is that the manager-mayors ranked the perceived 
influence of  all the political leaders (political mayor, leader of  the council and leader 
of  the executive board) higher than the political mayors ranked political leaders. As an 
example, 84 per cent of  manager-mayors ranked political mayors as having very high in-
fluence, as compared to 77 per cent of  political mayors. In the case of  the council leader, 
58 per cent of  manager-mayors ranked them very high in influence, in contrast to 29 per 
cent of  political mayors. Thirdly, in the case of  the leader of  the executive board, 67 per 
cent of  manager-mayors ranked this position as having a high influence, in contrast to 
33 per cent of  political mayors. This discrepancy may be explained by structural differ-
ences, as the political mayor is usually the chief  political leader, while in the case of  the 
manager-mayor political leadership is vested in the council leader or the leader of  the 
executive board. On average, the political leader had the highest score, with 4.65, fol-
lowed by the leader of  the executive board and the council leader. The manager-mayor 
had the lowest score, with the average score of  just 3.89. 
Table 4. How influential is the council and administrative staff?
 1 2 3 4 5 N Average (1-5)
Committee leaders 0 6 (8%) 40 (56%) 24 (33%) 2 (3%) 72 (100%) 3.31
Department heads 0 4 (10%) 30 (44%) 30 (44%) 1 (2%)0 68 (100%) 3.38
Council majority 0 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 10 (18%) 43 (78%) 55 (100%) 4.70
Council minority 1 (2%) 13 (24%) 26 (47%) 13 (24%) 2 (4%) 55 (100%) 3.09
Individuals in council 2 (3%) 4 (6%) 40 (56%) 24 (33%) 2 (3%) 72 (100%) 3.30
The effects of  local government structure are evident in Table 4, which shows that 
the council majority was estimated as being the most influential decision maker at the 
local level, with a score of  4.70. This is in strong contrast to the council minority, which 
was perceived as being the least influential decision-maker at the local level, with a score 
of  just 3.09. Moreover, in the case of  the influence of  the minority in the council, the 
political mayors estimated the influence of  the minority as substantially higher than the 
manager-mayors did. As an example, 30 per cent of  manager-mayors perceived the mi-
nority as having no influence or very little influence in local decision making, compared 
to 13 per cent of  the political mayors. The reasons for this are not entirely clear. It is 
possible that manager-mayors underestimate the influence of  the minority. European 
research has shown that councillors with executive responsibilities perceive their influ-
ence over decision making as much higher than those council members who have no 
such responsibilities (Getimis & Hlepas 2013). Members of  the minority in Icelandic lo-
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cal councils, in general, have limited executive responsibilities, which might explain why 
they are perceived to have little influence. Furthermore, the political mayors perceived 
the influence of  the council minority as much higher than did the manager-mayors. 
These differences may be explained by the fact that political mayors do not experience 
conflict within the council to the same extent as the manager-mayors do, which might 
lead them to overestimate the influence of  the minority in the council. However, there 
is only marginal information available on the power plays carried out within Icelandic 
local councils, and little is known about how council minorities perceive their influence. 
Nevertheless, manager-mayors and political mayors perceive the status of  the council 
minority in very different ways.
As mentioned above, manager-mayors ranked the perceived influence of  political 
mayors substantially higher than did the political mayors themselves. In a similar man-
ner, the manager-mayors also estimated their own perceived influence as substantially 
higher than the political mayors did. As an example, 73 per cent of  manager-mayors 
ranked themselves as having potentially high or very high influence in decision making 
in the local authority, as compared to 67 per cent of  political mayors. As one manager-
mayor pointed out during his interview, their potential power can be enormous.
I am fully conscious that in praxis I could be the most influential poli-
tician of  them all. I could get whatever I want. These are influences 
and power I do not wish for. The power can be enormous, the more 
so, the smaller the municipality, not to speak of  when individuals have 
great knowledge and are influential individuals. (Manager-mayor)
Although there are differences in how manager-mayors and political mayors perceived 
the potential influence of  the aforementioned players, the overall conclusion is that 
there is a high emphasis on political leadership. Individuals with political connections, 
such as members of  the council majority or committee and board leaders, are thus 
thought to be more influential than high-ranking officials within the administration or 
members of  the council minority. External actors are rarely considered to be influential 
over decision making, with the notable exception of  Icelandic regional associations and 
to some extent the cooperation boards. Weak partisan power is thus expressed in the 
lack of  influence of  local members of  parliament (MPs) and party leaders. This may 
come as a surprise, as the close ties between local MPs and their communities is a well-
known feature of  the Icelandic political system (Kristinsson 2015). Despite this fact, it 
seems that even though MPs are often suspected of  distributing favours to their con-
stituencies, Icelandic mayors do not perceive local MPs as having a significant influence 
on municipal decision making. Thus, there is a strong emphasis on local political lead-
ership, but that leadership is concentrated in the majority of  the council and executive 
board. Committee leaders do not seem to carry as much weight, which shows their weak 
position within the system. The reason for this may lie within the fact that the power of  
the committee leader is vested in a particular committee (Aars 2009). Committee leaders 
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may not be able to extend their influence over the boundaries of  their respective com-
mittees. The overall findings of  this section are in line with findings from a European 
study (Plüss & Kübler 2013) on local councillors where local politicians were identified 
as the most influential followed by the leader of  the administration and administrative 
staff. Similar to the Icelandic findings, external actors were seen as having only marginal 
influence when it comes to agenda setting in comparison with the political and admin-
istrative leadership.  
8. Policy making at the local level: strategic responses
As pointed out earlier in this paper there is a tendency in Icelandic public policy making 
to approach issues when they arise and policy often seems to happen haphazardly rather 
than with planning and foresight (Sigurgeirsdóttir 2006; Sigurgeirsdóttir 2005). By es-
tablishing that various political leaders are highly influential in council decision making, 
it becomes obvious that as political leadership is concentrated in the council and execu-
tive board, the individuals that sit on the council are crucial when it comes to long-term 
decision making. One experienced manager-mayor stated this clearly: 
I have had councils where I had no worries about the future; these 
were very active individuals who had clear visions of  where they were 
heading. Perhaps as I grow older in the position I see more clearly 
what needs to be done and thus I am becoming more dominating in 
my role. (Manager-mayor)
This manager-mayor describes a significant variation in political leadership among the 
council members. There is an overall consensus that setting a clear vision for the mu-
nicipality, envisioning the future of  the area and developing strategic direction are im-
portant tasks of  political leadership (Hambleton 2004). When such vision is lacking, the 
leadership or management of  the municipality becomes problematic. As pointed out 
earlier many manager-mayors felt that the council members’ lack of  political leadership 
had made their job difficult. Most of  the manager-mayors who felt they needed to take 
initiative in the policy process had experienced this lack of  political leadership. 
It is no secret that the chief  executive pushes the decision making 
forward at least for some issues. Here the politicians have tried to 
get together occasionally, too seldom, but at least they have met and 
discussed all the issues and attempted to set some goals. (Manager-
mayor) 
The manager-mayor cited above was recounting a situation in which there was a com-
plete lack of  long-term strategy. A political mayor from a small municipality admitted 
that the situation was problematic: ‘I think it is possible to say that at least for a while, 
we have been looking at the short term too much’. There were cases in which councils 
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initiated detailed and strategic long-term policy making. Such instances were, however, 
rare and more often found in larger municipalities with more than 2,500 inhabitants. 
The council committee system has often been criticised for being slow and unorgan-
ised (Larsen 2005). Many manager-mayors discussed the weaknesses of  the Icelandic 
committee system: ‘The main problem with this kind of  administration is the amateur-
ism. There are so many amateurs’. The Icelandic council-committee system is based 
on council members who work part time. The councils are also small in comparison 
to those in other Nordic countries. Icelandic council members are, therefore, more in-
volved in implementation processes than their Nordic counterparts (Kristinsson 2014). 
As was described earlier, most Icelandic municipalities are very small, and have a limited 
number of  core administrative staff. Expert knowledge is thus often brought into the 
administration through the manager-mayor (or political mayor) or an externally pur-
chased service. One manager-mayor described the situation in the following manner:
Sadly, I think the administration is too weak. This municipality has de-
veloped its administration in a way that is full of  quangos and various 
cooperation projects, things that the mayor has no say over. These are 
scattered independent agencies with their board and more or less own 
decision-making authority. This makes my work very complicated and 
does not fit my organisation chart. (Manager-mayor)
This manager-mayor felt that s/he lacked authority over the administration. Thus, the 
administration did not function properly and did not provide the central office with 
the support it needed. Several of  the manager-mayors described similar situations of  
unclear hierarchies within the local government system as well as difficulties within the 
governance process, especially in the various cooperation schemes. The problems were 
then intensified because of  the amateurism in the system. In several cases amalgamation 
was suggested as a possible solution to this problem.
The positive side of  the amalgamation would be that we might be able 
to bring more professionalism into these committees. There should 
be initiative and policy making but most of  the time there is none, it is 
just for gossip because the council members do what they like despite 
different ideas coming from the committee. (Manager-mayor)
As was evident from Table 4, the council and its leaders are relatively powerful, while 
the committee leaders are less influential. The quotation above shows that the position 
of  the committee is often problematic. The committee members are often not equipped 
for the decision making that is expected of  them. Moreover, their advice and decisions 
are often ignored by the council. This suggests similar to other studies (Plüss & Kübler 
2013) that councillors with no executive responsibilities or the so-called backbenchers 
have little influence in the decision making process. There is, however, limited research 
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available on the Icelandic committee system, which makes it difficult to generalise based 
on these findings. 
The above discussion has revealed that policy making in Icelandic local government 
is often a response to a pressing situation. Matters that arise in such situations tend to 
be immediate and concrete, such as the closure of  a fish processing plant, local lobbying 
for the construction of  a road tunnel or the implementation of  a fishing quota. One 
manager-mayor described the effects of  such reactive policy making: ‘My feeling is that 
what cries for a strategy that is where they are strategic, while the issues that are not as 
pressing fall behind’ (manager-mayor). This suggests a tendency for strategic response 
to be reactive rather than proactive.
9. Discussion
At the beginning of  this paper two main questions were put forward on the issue of  
leadership within local government policy making and the capacity of  the local admin-
istration. This discussion opens with the latter issue, namely ‘what conclusions may be 
drawn about the administrative capacity of  Icelandic local governance?’
Overall, the analysis shows that the capacity of  the Icelandic local administration 
measured in number of  specialised staff  is relatively low. There is a notable difference 
between municipalities with fewer than 2,500 residents versus those with more than 
2,500 residents. Municipalities with more than 2,500 residents demonstrated a more 
robust administration as they were able to have more specialised staff. Furthermore, 
they often employed several individuals with similar skillsets. Another indicator of  weak 
capacity in local administration was the level of  fragmentation that is capacity was not 
concentrated in specific areas but divided between various actors at different levels. As 
an example, both types of  mayors often need to rely on external actors for professional 
advice and support, such as the Local Government Association or committees within 
the inter-municipal cooperation scheme. This suggests that although the simple struc-
ture of  the local administration are often highly flexible and responsive (Randma-Liiv 
2002; Mintzberg 1983) there is very little hierarchy at the Icelandic local level, and the di-
vision of  labour is often unclear. There is also a profound lack of  specialised or support-
ing staff  in the local administration. However, it must be emphasised that these findings 
are not based on cross-country comparison but on a single case analysis; therefore, no 
conclusions can be made on the administrative capacity in relation to other countries. 
Nevertheless, the findings suggest that the Icelandic local administration may not always 
be equipped to provide other branches of  local government with the support they need.
This leads us to the other question this paper attempts to answer: who is leading the 
task of  developing strategic and policy direction at the Icelandic local level? The results 
show that the position of  the leading politicians as in leaders of  the council, executive 
board and a political mayor is strong when it comes to influencing strategic decision 
making at the local level. Yet many manager-mayors reported having to step in or take 
the initiative in goal setting and long-term policy making. These findings show there is 
an intense interaction between politics and administration within Icelandic local govern-
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ments similar to previous research (Stocker and Thompson-Fawcett 2014; Svara 1990). 
Moreover, the findings also show that manager-mayors are able, when requested, to en-
ter the political arena. Nevertheless, the findings reveal that there is a lack of  long-term 
strategic thinking, and policy is often conducted in an unstructured and reactive mode. 
This is in line with earlier findings that showed that the Icelandic public administration 
is less disciplined and professional than would be preferred in a modern administration 
(Sigurgeirsdóttir 2006; Sigurgeirsdóttir 2005; Kristinsson 1994).
When these findings are discussed in relation to the laymen system on which the Ice-
landic council-committee system is based, there are clear signs of  problems. First, as the 
system is based on the work of  amateur politicians it relies on a strong and knowledge-
able administration. Thus when there is a high turnover in the council combined with 
low administrative capacity it becomes difficult to accumulate and build upon previous 
knowledge. Second, this may lead to a situation where both the council and the admin-
istration become dependent on the manager-mayor as the ‘one with all the knowledge’. 
The third and last point is that this creates a system that is not sustainable as it relies too 
heavily on individuals and individual knowledge and not on the capacity of  the system 
itself. As more tasks and decision making power are being delegated to the local level, 
these problems are becoming more and more visible. 
Therefore, in order to be able to estimate more precisely the administrative capac-
ity of  Icelandic local authorities, further research is needed on the division of  labour 
between the council, local leaders and the local administration. 
 
Notes
1  A survey on the level of  Inter municipal cooperation was recently conducted by the University of  
Akureyri Research Centre. Please see:http://www.rha.is/static/files/Rannsoknir/2016/samstarf_
sveitarfelaga_lokaskyrsla.pdf. for further information
2  Data for this study was a part of  the Ph.D. project, The Icelandic mayor: A comparative analysis of  political 
and administrative leadership roles at the Icelandic local government level. The author is grateful to the Univer-
sity of  Iceland Research Fund for a grant rewarded to the Ph.D. research project.
3  Union des Dirigeant Territoriaux de L’Europe. 
4  See also Hlynsdóttir, Eva Marín (2016). Professionalism among Icelandic Mayors: Job Postings, 
Experience and Education as Determinants of  Professionalism at the Icelandic Local Level. Icelandic 
Review of  Politics and Administration Vol 12, Issue 1 (23-46).
5  Article 11 in the Local Government Act no. 138/2011 made some changes to the number of  
council members. Subsequently, municipalities with fewer than 2,000 residents have 5–7 members; 
those with between 2,000–9,999 residents have 7–11 members; those with between 10,000–49,999 
residents have 11–15 members; those with between 50,000–99,999 residents have 15–23 members; 
and those with more than 100,000 residents have 23–31 members. The capital of  Iceland, Reykjavík, 
was the only municipality that needed to make changes based on the new definition. However, these 
changes were postponed during the election for the 2014–2018 term.
6  The exception to the rule is found in the 1982–1986 term. During that time, Reykjavík’s city council 
had 21 councillors. The left-orientated majority in power in the council from 1978-1982 changed 
the number of  councillors, but the council majority of  the Independence Party changed it back. 
7  All tables are based on the authors compilation unless otherwise stated 
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